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Abstract

For years, the aviation industry has been under severe scrutiny over the safety of flight
when cockpit automation is over relied on and when it is under utilized. This double-edged
sword raises the question of situation awareness in aviation. With the recent boom in cockpit
automation and advanced avionics some fear that the pilots are being put outside "the loop".
Unfortunately, humans are notoriously poor monitors of reliable systems over time. However,
research is currently being conducted into a new form of display that has the ability to group a
myriad of aircraft mission and system status information onto one display, thereby providing
pilots with a clear and concise view of the "big" picture, in one glance. This display utilizes a
regular geometric shape generated on a polar graphic plot to indicate whether all monitored
parameters are within acceptable limits. Dubbed Mission Status Graphics, the regular geometric
shape will warp to a non-symmetrical form indicating that a mission or system parameter has
exceeded its normal operating range. NASA Langley Research Center is currently investigating
this display system for application to commercial aircraft cockpits; however, it is believed that
general aviation flight safety and pilot situation awareness could also benefit from the addition of
this display in future cockpit designs.
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1.0-Introduction

When given the task of monitoring reliable systems, humans perform poorly, especially
over long periods of time (Mackworth, 1950). Aviation systems are becoming increasingly more
automated, causing the role of a pilot on the modern flight deck to transform from operator to
supervisor. As a result it has become necessary to find a method of conveying information so
that even the least vigilant monitors can notice critical deviations of systems and mission
parameters in a timely manner (Trujillo, 2002). The ability of an aircrew to generate an accurate
internalized picture of the current state of their aircraft's mission and system performance is
essential in order to achieve an overall high level of situation awareness (SA). Since one of the
primary responsibilities of the modern aircrew is to develop SA and maintain it in a rapidly
changing environment, it is crucial that they be capable of seeing the "big" picture"(Trujillo &
Schutte, 1999). However, it is challenging to piece together the true state of the aircraft, at a
given moment, due to the complexity and quantity of factors that must be taken into account. A
pilot's ability to achieve a working understanding of the current state of their aircraft and the
subsequent ability to predict the future state of the aircraft, in the short term, is indicative of the
overall level of SA they are capable of reaching. Everyday, thousands of pilots are being forced
to perform monitoring tasks for which both the aircraft and man are ill equipped. To aid in this
effort, technology will need to be effectively employed in a manner consistent with human
factors design. The next generation of aircraft cockpits will need to have the operator interface
optimized for maximum human performance through the use of advanced avionics packages that
can incorporate critical information in to a more usable dynamic interface then those currently
seen in the aviation industry.

Perhaps polar-star displays, like those under development at NASA, will provide some of
the much needed situation awareness enhancement on the modern flight deck.

Polar star

displays consist of a regular polygon generated on a polar graphic coordinate plot. Each vertex
of the polygon represents a significant variable being monitored for fluctuation beyond
acceptable ranges. When all variables are reading normal, the polygon will be symmetric and
each vertex will lie on a circle. Conversely, when one or more variables are abnormal the
polygon will transform into an obviously asymmetric shape. The figure below (Figure la) shows
a polar star display with all variables normal and another (Figure lb) with two variables
abnormal. The polar star display format was originally developed for nuclear power plant

Figure 1 - Example polar star displays: all variables normal (a) and two variables abnormal (b)

control rooms however, NASA Langley recently took another look at polar star displays and
their potential for application to the dynamic modern aircraft flight deck environment. In what
they are calling mission status graphics (MSG), NASA's next generation polar star displays have
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the ability to logically group critical flight parameters onto one display, that currently are
inconsistently scattered across the multitude of commercial and general aviation instrument
panels in use in the aviation industry today. However, in order to understand the impact of polar
star displays in aviation an overview of situation awareness factors needs to be examined. It
needs to be emphasized that this area has not been well investigated and that the research
proposed below is the first step toward understanding the benefits that the MSG polar star
displays can provide in the fight to improve situation awareness in the cockpit.

LI

Foundations of Situation Awareness and the Situation Awareness Rating Technique (SART)
Endsley (1988), formally defines situation awareness as, "the perception of the elements

in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and
the projection of their status in the near future." Within this definition, Endsley alludes to the
three distinct levels of SA. Level 1 SA involves the perception of the relevant elements in the
environment.

The second level of SA is based on the synthesis of the disjointed Level 1

elements into a seamless comprehension of the current situation (Level 2 SA). Finally, the
ability to project the future actions of the elements in the environment, in the short term, is what
forms the third and highest level of situation awareness (Level 3 SA).
Situation awareness is not new. In fact, it has always been needed in order for people to
perform t asks e ffectively and accurately. H owever, a s t ime p assed, t he p hysical t asks o f o Id
were replaced by more elaborate perceptual and cognitive tasks. With the coming of the machine
age, emphasis shifted towards creating a new class of tools to help people perform tasks,
primarily of a physical nature, more easily. The computer age and the information age quickly
followed the machine age and the tools created by engineers suddenly became more complex,
shifting focus from physical tasks that dominated the machine age to more elaborate perceptual
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and cognitive tasks associated with the ever growing dependence on computer interfaces.
Unfortunately, when confronted with large quantities of data, supplied by the computers that
have become a part of everyday life, many operators may be even less informed then ever before,
lending support to Endsley's (2000) claim of an ever widening "information gap" between
advanced systems and those humans sitting at the controls. Today's aircraft pilots, air traffic
controllers, and power plant operators must perceive and comprehend a dazzling and bewildering
array of dynamic data that, by definition, is always changing. Therefore, in today's complex
environments, such as the modern flight deck, situation awareness must be maximized in order to
ensure errors are minimized (Endsley, 2000). With the promise of even more technology in the
future capable of generating an onslaught of information at speeds that exceed human
capabilities, it is important that designers employ cognitive engineering principles in their effort
to combat man's shortcomings as part of these advanced systems.
In the aviation domain, specifically on the flight deck of modern transport aircraft, the
perception of cues, Level 1 SA, is fundamental. Pilots must be aware of critical elements such as
terrain, other aircraft, warning lights, navigational data, and system status, along with their
relevant characteristics. The likelihood of forming an incorrect internal mental image of the
current state of the environment is dramatically escalated without a basic perception of the
mission and system critical information. In fact, Jones and Endsley (1996) found that 76% of
situation awareness errors in pilots could be traced to problems in perception of the needed
information due to either failures or shortcomings in the way systems convey pertinent
information or problems with the necessary cognitive process.
Level 2 of situation awareness can only be achieved once the perceptual process of Level
1 SA has taken place. With Level 2 SA, a working understanding of the significance, in light of
ones goals becomes apparent to the monitors. For example, during the cruise portion of a flight,
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if a catastrophic failure of an onboard system occurs it will be conveyed via visible and audible
warnings. The pilots must quickly take the holistic picture of the environment formed in Level 1
SA and come to a determination with regards to the airworthiness of the aircraft (Endsley, 2000).
According to Flach (1995), a person with Level 2 SA is one that is able to derive operationally
relevant meaning and significance from the Level 1 data perceived. The previous example
illustrates this transition from Level 1 SA to Level 2 SA as the decision process to determine
whether an emergency divert is warranted. Put more simply, Level 2 SA is analogous to having
a high level of reading comprehension as compared to just being able to read words (Level 1 SA)
(Endsley, 2000). In Jones and Endsley's (1995) research, 20% of situation awareness errors in
pilots were found to involve problems with Level 2 SA. This may be as a result of the sheer
quantity of variables that must be assimilated and digested in order to form a correct internalized
view of the "big" picture.
Most experienced pilots tend to spend a significant amount of their time anticipating
possible future occurrences thereby maximizing time and knowledge necessary to decide on the
most favorable course of action to meet their objectives. The ability to execute this dynamic
cognitive process is what separates Level 2 S A from Level 3 SA. The mark of a skilled expert,
according to Endsley (2000), is one who can visualize, maintain, and rely on, future projections
of their environment. Since Level 3 SA is the most difficult for pilots to achieve, only 3.4% of
situation awareness errors can be attributed to problems with its highest level, according to Jones
and Endsley (1995). Of the 3.4% of Level 3 errors, most can be attributed to the over projection
of current trends into fictitious emergencies thereby resulting in prudent yet unnecessary actions.
However, the relationship between performance and situation awareness can be a
problematic link. Good SA should increase the probability of good decisions and good
performance but it is not necessarily guaranteed. Therefore, measuring SA can be complicated.
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When measuring situation awareness subjectively, numerical values are typically
assigned to the quality of SA during a particular period or event. Unlike other types of SA
metrics, subjective estimations can be collected in controlled real world settings. Furthermore,
subjective measures offer the ability to accurately gauge situation awareness during the
evaluation of design concepts in simulator studies that mimic real world settings (Endsley &
Garland, 2000).
One such subjective measure of SA is the Situation Awareness Rating Technique
(SART). This self-rating scale is one of the best known and most thoroughly tested subjective
techniques for measuring situation awareness.

When using SART, one must assume that the

operators used some understanding of situations in making decisions, that this understanding is
available to consciousness, and that it can be readily made explicit and quantifiable when asked
(Gawron, 2000).
In order to develop scales appropriate for this SA measurement process, knowledge
elicitation techniques were utilized to determine which elements an aircrew considered to be
essential for good SA. From these interviews, ten generic SA constructs emerged that could be
clustered into three broad domains. The attentional demand domain is composed of following
constructs: instability of situation, variability of situation, and complexity of situation. The
second domain, attentional supply, is composed of arousal, spare mental capacity, concentration,
and division of attention. Understanding, the third and final domain, incorporates information
quantity, information quality, and familiarity (Endsley and Garland, 2000).

From these

constructs two types of SART were developed. For in-depth subjective ratings a ten dimensional
method is preferred where subjects are asked to indicate on a continuous scale their ratings in
response to each of the ten constructs listed above, for a given situation.

However, the

combination of the three broad domains make up an abbreviated and easily applied three
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dimensional SART scale that can be used when task complexity and the degree of intrusiveness
permitted by the measured tasks is minimal, making a shorter scale advantageous. When using a
3-D SART, the subjects will indicate their ratings for the three domains on a continuous 100millimeter line from low (0 mm) to high (100 mm). In the end, the ratings on the 3-D SART can
be combined to create a single value for subjective SA by employing the following formula
derived from theoretical considerations of how the three domains interact: SA (calc) =
Understanding - (Demand - Supply). For the proposed mission status graphics research, a 3-D
SART is preferred due to its unique advantages over other subjective techniques beyond the
inherent advantages of subjective measures in general. One advantage of SART is its high level
of ecological validity due to the fact that its dimensions were procured directly from operational
aircrew. Second, the constructs are general in nature and therefore have the potential to be
applied to non-aircrew domains thereby further bolstering validity. And finally, SART data
lends itself to easy interpretation when correlated with performance measures. Furthermore,
SART is simple to implement, easy to administer, economical, and non-intrusive, when
employed in either real world or simulated environments (Endsley & Garland, 2000). However,
SART does have limitations as well.

The confounding process of having operators rate their

own SA without knowing what they don't know or what errors may be present in their internal
representations of the situation; the possible influence of their performance on their ratings; and
the intermingling of the supply and demand on attention metrics with workload measurement
techniques, all serve as potential limitations to the SART method (Endsley, Selcon, Hardiman, &
Croft, 1998). In light of the pros and cons, the Situation Awareness Rating Technique (SART)
will be used to quantify experimental data on situation awareness for the proposed experiment
outlined below. In addition, accuracy questions will be combined with the 3-D SART to qualify

7

the subjective questionnaire and insure that the participants truly do understand the information
presented to them.
Looking beyond the accepted definitions and approved measurement methods,
fundamentally good situation awareness in the cockpit depends on a pilot's ability to possess and
process specific categories of geographical, spatial, system, environmental, and tactical data.
This data constitute the five general classes of elements needed for SA; the substructure for the
definition and the three distinct levels of SA described above.

1.2 — The Basic Elements of Situation Awareness
Situation awareness, on the modern flight deck, involves identifying what things the
aircrew needs to perceive, understand, and project into the future. In general, across many types
of aircraft systems, the five general classes of elements are needed in order for situation
awareness to be present (Garland, Wise, & Hopkin, 1999). The first class of SA elements
required is geographical situation awareness. Geographical SA refers to the location of the
aircraft, other aircraft in the vicinity, pertinent terrain features that may impact the flight path,
navigational way points including the desired path to destination, climb and descent points, as
well as, taxiway and runway arrangements when on the ground. The second class of required
elements for good aviation SA is spatial/temporal situation awareness. This class includes
variables like altitude, heading, attitude, velocity, flight path, and clearances, combined with
aircraft specific performance capabilities. System SA is the third class of situation awareness
elements that must be present for a correct visualization of the flight deck environment to be
possible.

System SA includes system status, functioning, and settings; air traffic control

communications; flight modes and automation entries; the impact of malfunctions and system
degradation on flight safety; in addition to fuel constraints. Weather formations, icing, ceilings,
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temperatures, clouds, fog, sun, visibility, turbulence, winds, IFR and VFR conditions and
requirements, and overall flight safety combine to make up environmental SA, the fourth class of
situation awareness elements required for an overall high level of situation awareness. The fifth
and final class of situation awareness elements, critical to the formation of a correct composite
SA model, i s tactical situation awareness. T actical S A includes identification, tactical status,
type, capabilities, location and flight dynamics of other aircraft; the aircraft's capabilities in
relation to other aircraft; and threat detection, prioritization, and projection (Garland, Wise, &
Hopkin, 1999). However, it is important to remember that each of the classes of SA elements
previously mentioned may not directly map on to Endsley's three levels of situation awareness
for all human senses (i.e. aural SA, tactile SA, etc) because a pilot's tasks are primarily visual.
Mission status graphics polar star displays, the focus of this study, are designed to
logically group the most pertinent flight parameters critical to spatial and system SA into a oneglance display.

Of the elements mentioned previously, MSG will monitor and display

information about onboard systems status (e.g. electrical, hydraulic) and mission status (e.g.
altitude, fuel). Therefore, it can be reasonably assumed that MSG will facilitate a more rapid
perception of cues (Level 1 S A) and a more accurate working understanding of the significance
of the perceived elements (Level 2 SA) with respect to the spatial and system parameters it was
designed to convey. That is to say, the mission status graphics display, in its current form, is not
intended to enhance all five elements of SA described previously but is designed to address
spatial and system situation awareness shortfalls that currently plague commercial and general
aviation. Also, it is important to note that neither mission status graphics nor polar star displays
have been investigated to determine their exact impact on situation awareness thereby creating a
need for the research proposed in this paper.

9

In addition to the basic elements of SA, there are several cognitive factors that can
influence situation awareness in both negative and positive ways that must also be considered
when designing and testing the next generation of cockpit automation.

1.3 - Cognitive Factors that can Influence Situation Awareness
The modern cockpit poses several challenges to even the most diligent flight crews.
Human attention capacity, one of the factors that can influence SA and measured directly in
SART, can be and often is strained by information overload, task complexity, and the requisite
multi tasking that comes as part of the complex and dynamic aviation environment (Endsley,
2000). Over time, situation awareness may suffer due to the allocation of attention to compelling
information drawing it away from less striking information that may be of equal or greater
importance. The lack of SA that occurs as a result can lead to poor decision-making that
ultimately is the underlying cause of human error.
Perhaps this is one area where the superior capabilities of polar star displays to portray
critical parameters more saliently then traditional methods will benefit SA. The asymmetric
polygon indicating one or more parameter is out of bounds, vertices that change color to indicate
problem severity, and the normal operating range reference circle, all "pop-out" out of the visual
scene to create emergent features that lead to pre-attentive visual processing (Pomerantz &
Pristach, 1989). Furthermore, the simplicity and the clarity of the uncluttered polar star display
format supports rapid information transfer to the pilot; in one glance, the critical mission and
system parameters can be viewed speeding up the perceptual process of Level 1 SA. Achieving
a working understanding of the perceived elements (Level 2 SA) can then be rapidly
accomplished by comparing each vertex to the reference circle. This allows the pilot to spend
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more time anticipating possible future problems, leaving more decision time to arrive at the most
favorable course of action and final result (Level 3 SA).
Poor SA resulting from attention problems in acquiring data, as evidenced by Endsley's
(1995) review of NTSB accident reports that showed that 31% of accidents involving human
error were due to this factor. In order to avoid such errors, pilots typically employ a process of
information sampling to bypass attention limits, according to Endsley (1995). This allows them
to attend to information in a rapid sequence following a predetermined pattern stored in longterm memory with consideration given to the relative priority of the data and the frequency with
which the data changes. However, humans do not always optimally sample the information
presented before them, demonstrating a need for a display like MSG that logically groups critical
parameters on one display thereby greatly reducing the size of a pilots scan pattern and the time
required for information sampling. Furthermore, the ever-present problem of information
overload can also lead the pilots to alter their normal sampling pattern causing them to allocate
too much attention to one or more elements while neglecting the other elements in the
environment that may be of equal or greater importance.

In order to overcome attention

problems and correctly know which information to focus on and which information can be
ignored, the pilot(s) must have, at some level, an understanding about all of the data as a whole,
that is to say they must possess the "big" picture (Endsley, 2000). In addition, the speed and
accuracy with which information is perceived during Level 1 situation awareness can be affected
by the contents of both working memory and long-term memory through the presence of
preexisting knowledge of the location of specific information, the form which the information
takes, and the element specific characteristics of the information (Davis, Kramer, & Graham,
1983). With mission status graphics, the contents of working and long-term memory would be
reduced since the location of specific information, the form it takes, and its characteristics would
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be the same across many of the critical flight parameters thereby shrinking the scan pattern,
reducing the time needed to view elements, and overall improving the accuracy of the perceptual
process.
Another limiting cognitive factor affecting situation awareness is working memory.
Level 2 SA requires that a pilot must combine new data with existing knowledge in working
memory to successfully paint a composite mental picture of the current state of his or her
aircraft. According to Miller (1956), the human working memory is capable of maintaining a
"magic number 7 plus or minus 2" chunks of information, at one time. Millers' analysis implies
that most or all limits on mental processes can be attributed to a single source. Functionally,
working memory is where all cognitive operations receive their data and produce outputs or
responses. Furthermore, working memory allows a pilot to retain relevant information like
airspeed, altitude, heading, and tail-number, for tactical operations.

In addition, working

memory relies heavily on long-term memory for the cognitive tasks of information organization,
decision-making, and problem solving. Time dependant processes like attention capacity and
forgetting all serve as limitations to working memory. Therefore, working memory clearly
permeates every aspect of a pilot's ability to assimilate and process information. Subsequently,
achieving Level 2 SA in such environments can often tax an already overloaded working
memory, thereby stretching a pilot's attention capacity leaving fewer resources to direct toward
the process of acquiring new data that may be occurring simultaneously. Reaching Level 3 SA
similarly affects working memory because forecasting future status and predicting the
appropriate course of action to take will burden working memory as well (Endsley, 1996). The
prediction of future states imposes a strong load on working memory by requiring the
maintenance of current conditions, future conditions, and the actions appropriate to address the
predicted future conditions, according to Wickens (1984). Therefore, it becomes clear that this
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heavy and highly undesirable load that the working memory is forced to endure, especially in the
higher levels of situation awareness, can seriously impact the formulation and selection of
responses in addition to hindering simultaneous and subsequent actions or decisions.
Just as overload in working memory can lead to decrements in situation awareness, the
type of information displayed and the manner in which it's conveyed can also affect overall
situation awareness.

1.4 - The Role of Mental Processing and Mechanisms in the Formation of Situation Awareness
When presented and asked to process dynamic and complex information people may
switch between data-driven and goal-driven processing.

With a data-driven or bottom-up

processing, a variety of environmental features are detected and their inherent properties are used
to determine which information will receive further focalized attention and processing (Endsley,
2000). Cue salience plays an important role in this process and to situation awareness as a
whole, by impacting which segments of the environment receive attention.

When people

function in a goal-driven or top-down fashion, SA can be influenced by the operator's goals and
expectations, which in turn can have a direct influence on how attention is directed, how data are
perceived, and eventually how the data are interpreted. In the cockpit, an aircrew's goals and
plans primarily direct their attention to the mission critical parameters that must be integrated,
interpreted, and acted upon, in light of these goals, to form and maintain level 2 SA. However, it
is possible to observe the interchange between top-down and bottom-up processing, allowing the
pilots to process large quantities of information dynamically in the cockpit. The ability of an
aircrew to juggle multiple competing goals effectively comes with experience and maintaining
these goals has been associated with distributed attention, critical in the aviation domain where
human performance has a direct effect on safety (Endsley, 2000).
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Yet another manner in which situation awareness can be affected is through automaticity in
processing information. Automaticity, a characteristic of cognitive processing in which practiced
consistent behaviors are performed rapidly, with minimal effort, and with automatic allocation of
attention to the processing of the stimulus, has its advantages and disadvantages. It is often
useful in overcoming attention limitations but can simultaneously leave the pilots susceptible to
missing novel stimuli that may impact the safety of flight (i.e. system or mission parameter
deviations) (Garland, Wise, & Hopkin, 1999). In complex environments, like the modern flight
deck, it is easy for actions to become habitual over time, demanding less attention then required.
When the stimulus changes ever so slightly it is possible for the pilots to miss it and carry out the
habitual action. Automaticity can impact every aspect of a flight from air traffic control
clearances, altitude changes, system performance properties, etc. As time goes by and pilot
experience increases, automatic processes tend to be fast, autonomous, effortless, and can occur
without conscious awareness or attention (Logan, 1988). However, automatic processing, for the
most part, is advantageous in that it provides reliable performance with minimal attention
allocation even though it may foster an increased risk by making highly experienced pilots less
responsive to new stimuli because automatic processes operate with limited use of feedback.
Maintaining a high level of situation awareness when using automatic processing is crucial in
order to avoid non-typical situations that may decrease decision-making timelines and overall
decision effectiveness (Endsley, 2000).
By providing pilots with a polar star display like mission status graphics, it may be
possible to reduce the transitions pilots must perform between goal-driven and data-driven
processing required by them to maintain situation awareness in a dynamic and information rich
environment. Such a reduction could translate directly into performance improvements like a
decrease in failure detection time, while improving the reliability of automaticity by fostering a
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more accurate and complete understanding of the "big" picture in the minds of the pilots sitting
at the controls.
Engineers and designers of the next generation of cockpit avionics and automation have a
daunting responsibility to improve situation awareness on the modern flight deck.

Careful

consideration must be given to human factors when determining ways to: effectively deliver
critical cues, ensure and safeguard expectation of accuracy; develop systems for assisting pilots
in deploying attention efficiently; develop methods for preventing the disruption of attention
especially during non-normal events with high workload and stress factors; and to develop
systems that are compatible in achieving the aircrew's goals.

Each new piece of technology

provides a potential advantage for delivering new information, more accurate information, new
ways of providing or displaying information, or the reduction of crew workload (Endsley, 1996).
However, that is not to say that each new system may not also affect SA in unpredicted and
possibly negative ways. Innumerable factors surrounding the implementation and integration of
new technology and design concepts may act to degrade situation awareness. To prevent adverse
affects from future automation, significant care must be taken to evaluate the impact of proposed
systems on the overall situation awareness of its operators. It is only through thorough testing
and carefully controlled studies that the actual significance of new technology can be ascertained
(Garland, Wise, & Hopkin, 1999).
Aircraft are evolving with every new breakthrough in technology. More systems are
being added which implies that more parameters will need to be monitored by the pilots in their
quest to achieve and maintain high levels of situation awareness. Since instrument panel space is
limited, and may become even smaller in the next few decades due to aerodynamic constraints,
simply adding more digital representation of analog "steam-gauge" style displays will not be an
option. One possible way to employ technology to improve situation awareness on the modern
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flight deck is to use polar-star displays that will show deviations from normal in a more salient
manner by employing a polygon's vertices to report pertinent mission and systems values.

2.0 - Background and Theory of Polar Star Displays and Mission Status Graphics

2.1- Polar Star Displays
The notion of displaying critical parameters via a polar graphic plot has been around for
decades. First employed in the domain of nuclear power plants, in 1981, Westinghouse Electric
Corporation, under contract with the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), investigated a
new format for displaying various nuclear power plant safety parameters that involved
employing what they called an "Iconic Polargraphic Safety Parameter Display System" that uses
the points of a polygon on a polar graph plot to depict system status.
After the accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania during
March 1979, an assortment of investigations revealed significant deficiencies in the area of manmachine interface design. More specifically, the preexisting methods of data display failed to
present a concise picture of the overall safety state of the power plant to the operators. In
response to the events at Three Mile Island a variety of safety parameter display systems (SPDS)
were researched and designed with the overall goal of conveying the safety state of the power
plant in a concise and timely manner in order to enhance detection and assessment of potential
threats that may compromise safety (Woods, Wise, & Hanes, 1981). From the wide range of
proposed SPDS prototypes, Westinghouse chose two concepts for the EPRI study.
The first SPDS, deemed Safety Panel A, brought together several key variables grouped
according to five major safety functions: primary coolant inventory, core heat removal,
secondary heat removal, reactivity control, and radioactive containment integrity.

The

aforementioned variables were displayed as a thirty minute trend using a standard Cartesian
graph format, plotted on a logarithmic scale to p rovide operators with w ide range indications
about overall plant status (Woods, Wise, & Hanes, 1981).
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The second SPDS, Safety Panel B, used an iconic polar star display format to present a
comprehensive summary of plant health. The display took on the form of an octagon with each
of the eight spokes in the figure representing the scale for a particular safety parameter. Normal
conditions were plotted on the polar graph as fixed points equidistant from the center of the plot.
The resulting regular geometric pattern created a frame of reference from which to judge
abnormal conditions. Parameters with increasing magnitudes were plotted as points further away
from the center of the figure while parameters with decreasing magnitudes were potted as points
closer to the center of the plot. Furthermore, the reference parameters were dynamically scaled
as a function of operational mode of the power plant so that the reference figure was always
perfectly octagonal. Therefore, abnormal conditions would result in an irregular geometric
pattern that clearly would deviate from the reference octagon (Woods, Wise, & Hanes, 1981).
Westinghouse went on to conduct an experiment at a nuclear power plant simulator
designed primarily for operator training. In addition, the experiment was created to mesh the
study with a previously scheduled regular training session for a four-loop pressurized watercooled reactor in both normal and non-normal states. Eight crews of three experienced, licensed
operators per crew, at the simulator for a routine five-day refresher course, served as subjects for
the Westinghouse experiment. Each crew, according to the experimental design, experienced all
sixteen abnormal reactor events that consisted of both diagnostic problems and multiple failure
events. Four of the crews were run through the sixteen scenarios with only the existing control
panel whereas the remaining four crews experienced the scenarios with one of the SPDS
prototypes added to the standard control room. Only one SPDS was available per crew and
experimental control was achieved through counterbalancing transients and SPDS prototypes
across crews (Woods, Wise, & Hanes, 1981).
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Data was collected from two sources by the researchers. The first source was a computer
record of all control actions and process parameter values during each event. The second source
of data collected during the experiment was from observation of crew behavior from video and
audio recordings of each event. Woods, Wise, and Hanes' (1981) cumulative, untraditional,
three-fold data analysis focused on how the prototype SPDS aided operator performance. First,
event timelines were produced for each scenario that crews encountered, based on the computer
records and video/audio of each of the events. By mixing together these data sources a record of
each data collection run was created that correlated plant state, operator problem solving
behavior, and operator actions. Second, decision charts that captured the links between decision
and operator actions (e.g. crew strategy) were compiled to highlight the cumulative decision
making process for each event. The third part of the data analysis process was to separate
categories of key decisions and identify patterns of SPDS usage as a function of the
predetermined decision categories (Woods, Wise, & Hanes, 1981).
The authors stated that the decision analysis approach helped achieve the experimental
goals of this nuclear power plant control room evaluation, according to the researchers, by
helping t o a ssess h ow t he S PDS p rototypes i nfluenced o perator b ehavior. " In t he d omain o f
nuclear power plant operation, it is not enough to know what the operator did, it's also important
to understand the decision/action context so future training modules can be modified
appropriately to reflect what was learned in this study." according to Woods, Wise, and Hanes
(1981). By knowing the decision context, operator actions were aggregated into decision/action
paths thereby allowing the researchers to evaluate the SPDS in terms of the role the addition
played in the evolution of the decision paths. This was a critical clue to the researchers in their
efforts to refine the decision making process that nuclear power plant operators undertake when
troubleshooting problems (Woods, Wise, & Hanes, 1981).
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The results of the Westinghouse decision analysis study found no clear quantitative or
qualitative benefits with one SPDS over the other. In other words Safety Panel A did not do any
better than Safety Panel B, and vice-versa, but the results of the decision analysis did suggested
that in the test situations where an SPDS was used the crew was able to return the plant to a safe
configuration sooner and with fewer parameter excursions than in situations when the SPDS was
either not available or not utilized. However, a complete safety panel effectiveness evaluation
based on plant state was not performed because some crews either chose not to use the panel or
were unsuccessful accessing the safety panel.

During the experiment, the safety panels -

relatively unfamiliar tools, attempted to compete with a very familiar tool - the standard control
board instrumentation. As experimenters expected, the SPDS were not used at times when it
could have provided useful data to the operators. Primarily, the person acting as shift supervisor
tended to access the safety display panels more frequently then the other two support crew
members (Woods, Wise, & Hanes, 1981). A multitude of factors such as display placement,
display access, crew training, standard control room procedures, and individual crew differences
had an impact on the usage, or lack thereof, of the SBDS prototypes. The researchers went on to
say that SPDS usage might have been higher had the panel been located more centrally.
However, the researchers did not state how they arrived at these conclusions.
Overall, according to Woods, Wise, & Hanes, (1981), the Westinghouse experiment
achieved its major objectives. The experimenters stated that the analysis of key decisions made
by the crews while responding to simulated plant accidents provided important insights about
nuclear power plant crew performance in the domains of crew decision behavior, safety panel
usage, decision analysis, and the use of a training simulator as a research tool.

Furthermore,

crew decision behavior was found to be based on a bottom-up, or data-driven, view of the control
room panel. Safety panel usage occurred successfully on most trials, as demonstrated by the fact
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that the shift supervisor frequently accessed the safety panel, with numerous recorded instances
where reference to the SPDS aided in problem recognition and plant control tasks but were little
or no help with crew decision planning. "The decision analysis method developed and applied in
this research proved to be a very useful tool for identifying crew decisions and actions,"
according to Woods, Wise, and Hanes (1981).

In addition, it provided a context for the

researchers that helped them understand the basis for their decisions and actions along an event
timeline. Finally, according to the research, it became clear that a training simulator could be
used during normal training as an effective tool for evaluating potential control room
modifications such as the Safety Parameter Display Systems in their experiment. The
experimenters went on to state that the limited use of the SPDS was as a result of: variations in
crew styles, differences among crew response strategies, the small number of operator
difficulties, the amount of wide variation of safety panel usage, the small sample of crews, the
difficulties o f d efining meaningful p erformance m easures, a nd t he 1 imitations i mposed b y t he
retraining program in which the experiment had to be incorporated (Woods, Wise, & Hanes,
1981).
This research clearly indicates that integrated information displays, like safety parameter
displays s ystems, h ave t he p otential t o e nhance situation a wareness i n c omplex e nvironments
where numerous parameters need to monitored and projected into the future by the operator
because of the inherent capabilities of the SPDS to logically display critical parameters in a more
salient and clear method. The decision analysis approach utilized in this study showed that by
presenting the needed information about status in a more salient manner on the SPDS panel the
often complicated cognitive functions of problem recognition and control tasks could be
simplified. A dmittedly, t he a uthors o f t he E PRI r eport c all for m ore r esearch i nto t he S PDS
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prototypes. However, it was not until recently that one of the display types was resurrected for
further research, this time for an aerospace application.

2.2 - Mission Status Graphics
The flight deck of an aircraft is an extremely complex environment - especially during
busy non-normal situations, similar to the control room in nuclear power plants.

Situation

awareness often suffers as this complexity increases. In an information rich environment, like the
cockpit of an aircraft, individual details can often become compelling, causing the human to
overlook other prominent sources of information. In environments such as this, the operators
need a way to quickly assess the situation when critical information is spread across multiple
displays (Trujillo & Schutte, 1999). Previous research has shown that automated monitors, like
the terrain collision avoidance system (TCAS) recently approved by the FAA, can aid humans in
recognizing and dealing with failures or emergencies (Trujillo, 2002). Polar star displays are an
ideal candidate for implementation as an automated monitor due to its emergent features
mentioned earlier. Global failure detection can be effectively supported by these emergent
features if they clearly carry information about important system states, according to Buttigieg
and Sanderson (1991). Polar star displays, by design, consist of a polygon where each vertex of
the polygon represents an abstracted parameter as an emergent feature of the display (Woods,
Wise, & Hanes, 1981). When all the parameters are in the normal or expected range, the
polygon i s r egular (i.e. symmetrical) a nd can b e r einforced b y t he a ddition o f a d otted c ircle
added around the polygon representing the normal operating range.

During non-normal

situations, the parameters deviate from the reference circle either outwardly or inwardly
respective to the sign of the value of the parameter with regard to the normal or expected value.
Therefore, an irregular polygon indicates a possible problem (Trujillo & Schutte, 1999).
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Recently, NASA has resurrected the polar star display for application to the next
generation of glass cockpit avionics research. Dubbed Mission Status Graphics (MSG), the
display consists of two polar star graphics, one mission oriented and the other system oriented.
The mission graphic consists of parameters like altitude, speed, fuel, course, heading, and
vertical speed. Similarly, the system graphic consists of parameters like hydraulic, electrical,
avionics, communication, engine, and fuel, systems. The figure below shows hypothetical polar
star mission status graphics displays (Figure 2).

Figure 2 - Hypothetical polar star mission status graphics displays

The manner in which these displays are designed is under some scrutiny. For example,
Bartolone and Trujillo (2002), conducted a survey of forty-one glass cockpit airline transport
pilots investigating various aspects of a hypothetical mission status graphics display. The survey
results indicated that the MSG system display should indicate that a parameter is out of bounds
by advancing and retreating the vertex according to the respective system/component value in a
continuously updating (i.e. free-flowing) manner.
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Pilots prefer to confirm receipt of the

information by depressing an "acknowledgement button" on the MSG display screen rather then
allowing problem resolution to act as acknowledgment. The survey also showed preference for
the MSG display panel to be the same size as current glass cockpit CRT's and should be ideally
located in the center of the primary instrument panel for clear viewing from either the pilot or copilot positions. Furthermore, the pilots surveyed felt MSG would be beneficial for observation,
problem investigation and isolation, and overall that the system would be a valuable item to
include of future flight decks (Bartolone & Trujillo, 2002).
After receiving a favorable response to the mission status graphics display from the glasscockpit commercial airline pilots surveyed, NASA began a series of controlled experiments
incorporating the MSG display into a high-fidelity flight simulator. To date, the findings of only
one experiment have been published. This initial experiment was designed to investigate two
issues with regards to how the display should move: (1) whether the display movements should
be continuous or discrete, and (2) if the parameters that make up each vertex should move in one
direction only (independent of sign) or move in both directions with movement indicative of the
parameters sign (Trujillo, 2002). The within subject variables for the experiment were the
movement type and movement direction of the vertices during six experimental trials.
During each trial, only one parameter would reach an "alert" condition and then it would
maintain that condition until the subject clicked the stop button indicating that he was ready to
answer questions about what was just observed. The subjects were then asked to rate, on
continuous Likert-scales, their responses to five questions about how easy or difficult it was to
use the MSG display. Furthermore, the subjects were encouraged to use a figure provided to
them that detailed the parameters that made up each vertex in order to provide a frame of
reference and enhance realism of the study. Once the subject submitted their answers for the
first data trial, the next trial would begin. The process was repeated for the remaining trials for
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the first display and then would begin all over again for the second display, following the within
subjects experimental design. After all the data runs were complete, the subject was asked to
answer the NASA-TLX questionnaire so a measure of workload could be established (Trujillo,
2002).
In this experiment, several dependent measures were recorded. The amount of time spent
looking at the display and the amount of time to answer the associated questions were recorded
by the computer as objective data measures; the computers clock started and stopped each time
the s ubj ect t ransitioned between s cenario a nd q uestionnaire o r v ice v ersa.

The rankings t he

subjects provided during the display questionnaires, NASA-TLX, and final comprehensive
questionnaire, were recorded as the subjective dependent measures for the experiment.
Based on the results of the experiment, Trujillo concluded that relative movement of the
polar star display is best. Not only did subjects prefer this type of display movement, statistical
evidence showed that they actually performed better with relative movement direction of the
polar graphic. Unfortunately, no clear advantage was evident for either continuous or discrete
movement type.

Therefore, Trujillo determined that future NASA Langley experiments

involving the MSG display would feature a continuous-relative polar-star graphic and will occur
in a high-fidelity fully programmable flight simulator running a full mission simulation. This
real world setting would help researchers determine whether or not the MSG display does, in
fact, aid in monitoring aircraft mission and system health and overall problem detection and
diagnosis (Trujillo, 2002). Although situation awareness was not addressed with this initial
NASA research, the fact the subjects in the NASA experiment found the display useful indicates
that further research in this domain is warranted, hence the need for the research in this thesis.
Due to mission status graphics concise integration of pertinent information, its strong
emergent features, and its potential to enhance information processing, it is believed that pilot
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situation awareness will improve. Although none of the information included in the MSG
display is new, it represents the next step in cognitively organized display technology designed
with regard to human factors from the out set. The addition of another display panel to the
modern flight d eck i s a precarious d ecision. H owever, when t he d isplay h as t he p otential t o
increase situation awareness and overall have a positive impact the safety of flight, industry
cannot ignore it. Thus far, Trujillo's research has demonstrated that the MSG displays can be
useful for integrating complex information in a meaningful manner, but the link to SA hasn't
been made yet. That is the purpose of this study. Pilots are being overloaded with information
in an intense and stressful environment. However, the mission status graphics display has the
ability to improve the delicate relationship between machine and operator as has been shown in
previous polar star display research and the underpinning of situation awareness outlined
previously.

Furthermore, integrated display technology already in use in corporate and

commercial aviation cockpits like the next generation of weather displays, terrain avoidance
displays, navigation displays, and traffic avoidance displays, have already demonstrated that
automated monitor type systems that group logical data together efficiently can serve to enhance
situation awareness. Therefore, it is logical to assume that the mission status graphics polar star
display, with its integrated data display format, will also improve situation awareness. However,
investigating the application of integrated displays to a general aviation cockpit has thus far not
been considered; there are many benefits for such an application.
All pilots must first begin their flight training in general aviation aircraft making this
environment ideal for the introduction of a display such as mission status graphics. During
training, keeping your head up and looking outside the aircraft is critical, however, maintaining
situation awareness is also of equal importance. With the incorporation of a MSG display, pilots
will be able to acquire, at a glance, the overall mission and system health of the aircraft they are
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piloting without the time and resource intensive process of data assimilation from a myriad of
dials, gauges, screens, and displays.
The proposed study outlined below is expected to uncover improvements in pilot failure
detection time, situation assessment, and situation awareness. According to Endsley (2000), the
problem with today's systems is not a lack of information, but finding what is needed when it is
needed. An ever-widening gap exists between the illogically scattered volumes of data being
produced by today's avionics and a pilot's ability to find the data that are important. Endsley
(2000), calls this the "information gap" and labels it as a primary challenge to situation
awareness. Therefore, it is up to the designers of future systems to provide the operator with the
needed information and capabilities while insuring that it is provided in a way that is useable
cognitively as well as physically (Endsley, 2000).
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3.0-Hypotheses

3.1 - Failure Detection Time
Based on the experiment outlined below and the previous research in the domains of
situation awareness and polar star displays, it is expected that the addition of the mission status
graphics display will improve performance of pilots with respect to time required for failure
detection. Although failure detection time specifically has not been measured in previous polar
star research, Woods, Wise, and Hanes' (1981), investigation of safety parameter display
systems (SPDS) did show that the crew was able toreturn the nuclear power plant to a safe
configuration sooner and with fewer parameter excursions using an SPDS display than in
situations when the SPDS was either not available or not utilized.

3.2 - Situation Awareness
Situation awareness (SA) will be improved for the instrument panels that include the
mission status graphics (MSG) polar star display compared to the conventional instrument panels
as measured by scores on the SART questionnaires administered to each subject at the end of
each trial. It is important to remember that situation awareness has not yet been measured for
polar star displays, making this research long overdue. Furthermore, all of the scenarios utilized
in the experiment are expected to demonstrate situation awareness in the subjects to some degree
based on the measure of their responses to the post scenario SART questions.

3.3 - Scenario Type
Since mission status graphics are designed to integrate critical mission and systems
parameters onto one display, the evaluation of the display will involve seven mission and seven
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system scenarios, constituting the two levels of the independent variable "scenario type".
However, such an application of polar star displays has not yet been researched there is no clear
evidence to indicate that mission status graphics will be more useful for one type of scenario
over another. Furthermore, it is hypothesized that there will be no interaction between the two
independent variables of scenario type and display type.
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4.0 - Methods

4.1 - Participants
As with any credible scientific research, subject selection is critical. For the proposed
experiment, volunteers from the Embry Riddle Aeronautical University Daytona Beach Campus
were used. Since the display being evaluated in this experiment was aimed toward application in
future general aviation cockpits, only Aeronautical Science majors (those training to become
professional pilots) were considered for subject selection. A total often subjects were used for
data collection in the pilot study and each possessed a minimum of a FAA Private Pilot License
with an instrument rating due to the instrument reading tasks required for this experiment.
Normally, a statistical power analysis would be performed to ensure enough subjects to
exceed a statistical power of 0.80. However, in this case, the lack of previous research in the
domain of mission status graphics polar star displays precluded the possibility of performing
such an estimate. Therefore, an investigative pilot study was performed in order to arrive at an
estimate of sample size for a follow-up experiment.

4.2 - Materials and Apparatus
To perform the experiment, several items needed to be acquired or created.

A PC

running customized software capable of displaying high-resolution picture files of a generic
general aviation aircraft instrument panel was the primary piece of experimental equipment. In
addition, fourteen uniquely different scenarios that correspond to realistic in-flight events
common to general aviation aircraft were scripted. The scripted scenarios were based on similar
scenarios scripted for a dynamic high fidelity Cessna Citation X flight simulator experiment
scheduled by NASA Langley for the near future. However, since the research called for a static
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scan of a generic general aviation (GA) instrument panel, only the failure or event concepts are
similar between this study and the one planned by NASA. With that said, two slides of the static
GA " instrument p anel v iew" for each s cenario were created. O ne s lide h ad t he M SG d isplay
included in the "instrument panel view" (Figure 3), the other had a weather display in place of
the MSG display (Figure 4). In this case, the weather display served as ambiguous filler for the
space occupied by the MSG display in the experimental instrument panel, thereby achieving
balance between the panels. A simple timer within the software measured the subjects' failure
detection time to each scenario and the time was recorded in a hidden file for analysis.
Worksheets of the standard 3-D SART questionnaires (Appendix A) and situation accuracy
questions were created as well, so that situation awareness measures could b e quantified and
qualified before being included in the data analysis. Finally, a laminated copy of the "all
conditions normal" instrument panel with the appropriate experimental display were created and
provided for each subject to refer to while participating in the experiment.
The generic general aviation instrument panels used in this experiment were all
composed of the same gauges and instruments with the exception of the MSG display. Each
gauge or instrument was capable of being set to depict the necessary information appropriate for
each experimental scenario so that the entire panel would contain the same information as if the
scenario were a real world situation. The gauges and instruments that made up each panel were
identical to those found in a pressurized single engine general aviation aircraft with retractable
landing gear as viewed from the pilot in command position (Figures 3 & 4).

4.3 - Experimental Design
A randomized 2 x 2 mixed factorial design was adopted for this experiment. This design
called for the random assignment of subjects into two experimental groups. Each group was
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exposed to the appropriate levels of both the display type and scenario type independent
variables, simultaneously. The control group saw the "instrument panel view" slide for each of
the fourteen different scenarios (7 mission and 7 system) with the weather display in place of the
MSG display, as seen in Figure 3. The experimental group was run through the same fourteen
scenarios (7 mission and 7 system) as the first group with the addition of the MSG display to the
"instrument panel view" in place of the weather display, as seen in Figure 4. The dependant
variables for this experiment were the time that elapses between the onset of the scenario and the
point when the subject acknowledged the detection of the problem (i.e. failure detection time)
and the subject's perceived situation awareness (3-D SART scales). Scenario type and the
presence of the MSG display acted as the independent variables as it was unknown whether
MSG would aid the subjects equally regardless of scenario type or more for mission or systems
situation awareness.
The scenarios that were employed for this research constituted an assortment of common
system failures and mission deviations within the general aviation domain. Prior to entering a
scenario, the subjects had knowledge of what the status of the aircraft shouldbe. W hen the
scenario began, it was the subject's job to scan the instrument panel, perceive the data (Level 1
SA), and comprehend the data (Level 2 SA). Once this had occurred and the subject was
confident they knew what the scenario depicted, they acknowledged such by clicking stop, the
scenario was terminated, and the SART questionnaire designed to quantify SA was administered.

4.4 - Experimental Procedures
Upon arrival, every subject was greeted and asked to read and sign a consent form.
Individually, each subject was exposed to the appropriate level of the independent variable based
on a group assignment by the experimenter. For the pilot study, the subjects were scheduled to
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sit for the experiment in two groups of five subjects per group. In order to avoid the difficulties
of group scheduling, the subjects for the follow-up study were allowed to sit for the experiment
individually when it was convenient for him or her.
For both experiments, each subject was seated in front of a PC, the software was
initialized, the subject viewed the first slide, when ready he or she clicked the stop button
indicating that they knew the state of the aircraft, the slide went black, the failure detection time
was recorded by the software, and finally the subject responded to the post scenario 3-D SART
and situation accuracy questionnaire.

Each subject's responses to the three metrics of the 3-D

SART were recorded by the subject drawing a short perpendicular line through the continuous
100-millimeter scales for each of the three measures: understanding, demand on attentional
resources, and supply of attentional resources (Appendix A). This data was later translated into
numerical values in the form of distance from zero in millimeters and input into the accepted
formula of SA (calc) = Understanding - (Demand - Supply). Finally, the numerical value of SA
was combined with the accuracy data (accuracy questionnaire) and performance data from the
experiment (failure detection time) and a composite overview of each subject's situation
awareness was arrived at for each scenario in each level of the experimental variable.
Once all the necessary data were collected from a subject, he or she was debriefed,
thanked, and allowed to go. The elapsed failure detection time and each subject's SART
responses were coded for statistical analysis. Furthermore, if a subject indicated they knew the
status of the aircraft, yet gave an incorrect response with regard to status via the post scenario
accuracy questions, their data was still recorded for analysis. Subject scheduling differed from
the pilot study to the follow-up study. In the pilot study, the subjects performed the experiment
in two groups of 5 whereas in the follow-up study each subject was scheduled individually.
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Figure 3 - "Instrument Panel View" with Mission Status Graphics Display

Figure 4 - "Instrument Panel View" without Mission Status Graphics Display
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5.0-Results

5.1 - Experiment 1
The data collected during Experiment 1 for failure detection time, SART scores, and
accuracy, were organized so that the data gained for each subject were grouped by SCENARIO
TYPE, (the within subjects variable), and by DISPLAY TYPE, (the between subjects variable).
With respect to SCENARIO TYPE (i.e. mission scenario vs. system scenario), the means for
failure detection time and SART were calculated for each subject. The means were then entered
into SPSS's repeated measures analysis component with SCENARIO TYPE as the repeated
measure. The accuracy questions that followed each scenario were not statistically analyzed.
This experiment was initially intended to serve as a pilot study in order to estimate an
appropriate sample size for a subsequent experiment.

Ten Embry Riddle Aeronautical

University students working towards their Aeronautical Science bachelor degrees were recruited
to serve as subjects for this experiment. The tables (1 & 2) below list the results of a brief
background questionnaire administered to each volunteer before the experiment.

Table 1 Experiment 1: Average Age and Flight Experience
Display

Demographic

Mean

Std. Deviation

Age(yrs)

22.6

1.14

WX

N

5
Experience (hrs)

308.00

61.09

Age (yrs)

22.0

2.00

MSG

5
Experience (hrs)

345.00
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127.96

Table 2 - Experiment 1: Subject Gender and Training Location
Training Location

Gender
Display

Male

Female

ERAU only

ERAU & NonERAU

WX

5

0

3

2

MSG

5

0

1

4

Failure detection time was found to be substantially larger in this experiment for those
subjects whose generic instrument panel did not include the Mission Status Graphics (MSG)
polar star display; DISPLAY TYPE, F(l,8) = 26.85, p<0.001.

Furthermore, in the group of

subjects who saw the generic weather display in place of MSG on their instrument panels, failure
detection time was larger for system failure or deviation detection than for mission failure or
deviation detection as evidenced by the statistically significant factor of SCENARIO TYPE,
F(l,8) = 49.18, pO.OOl. Within the group of subjects who saw the MSG, display failure
detection time stayed virtually the same across both mission and system scenarios. Essentially,
those subjects in the MSG display group were, on average, able to detect system failures or
deviations four times faster then those without MSG. Similarly, mission deviations or failures
were, on average, detected twice as quickly by those subjects with MSG then those without.
These unequal variations in detection time are supported by the statistically significant
interaction of DISPLAY TYPE by SCENARIO TYPE, F(l,8) = 48.59, pO.OOl.

Additional

output from SPSS can be seen in the table of means (Table 3) and the statistical source table
below (Table 4).
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Table 3 - Experiment 1: Table of Means for Failure Detection Time
Failure
Detection
Time
Mission
Scenarios

System
Scenarios

Display
Condition

Mean (ms)

Std. Deviation

N

WX Display

7084.63

2632.48

5

MSG Display

3088.63

238.36

5

WX Display

12106.40

3149.13

5

MSG Display

3103.60

342.52

5

Table 4 - Experiment 1 : Source Table for Failure Detection Time
Source

df

SS

MS

F

Eta2

Observed
Power

Display

1

211211002

211211002

26.85**

0.77

0.99

Error

8

629224927

7865616

Scenario

1

31710973

31710973

49.17**

0.86

1.00

Interaction

1

31335058

31335058

48.59**

0.85

1.00

Error

8

5159496

644937

Total

19

908641455

282767586

**(p< 0.001)

The Situation Awareness Rating Technique (SART) provided a numerical estimate of
subjective situation awareness for each scenario viewed by the subjects. In general, the larger
the value returned for SA the better the subjects' situation awareness. The subject's responses to
the SART metrics were also analyzed via a repeated measures ANOVA, with SCENARIO TYPE
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again serving as the repeated measure. A main effect for DISPLAY TYPE was found however,
there was no effect for SCENARIO TYPE or the interaction of DISPLAY TYPE by SCENARIO
TYPE. SA was substantially larger for the MSG display group than the weather display group,
as evidenced by the statistically significant mean differences for the between subjects variable
DISPLAY TYPE, F(l,8) = 126.26, pO.OOl. For both mission and system scenarios, the average
SA was nearly twice as large for the MSG group as the weather group. Additional statistical data
for the SART repeated measures ANOVA can be seen in the table of means (Table 5) and the
statistical source table (Table 6) below.

Table 5 - Experiment 1: Table of Means for SA Scores
SA

Mission
Scenarios

System
Scenarios

Display Condition

Mean

Std. Deviation

N

WX Display

90.29

7.92

5

MSG Display

172.54

17.04

5

WX Display

87.77

8.95

5

MSG Display

167.40

12.13

5

The accuracy questions that followed the 3-D SART on the post scenario questionnaires
were not statistically analyzed due to the fact that nearly ever subject responded correctly to the
questions for all scenarios presented to them with the exception of the Fuel Low - Left Tank
mission scenario. Three subjects in the weather display group incorrectly indicated that "Fuel
Low-Left Tank" scenario was a system failure or deviation. Excluding these incorrect responses,
every subject was able to classify and identify the failure or deviation seen in each scenario
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thereby lending support to the subjective SART metrics by insuring that each SA score computed
was based on confirmed knowledge of the scenario depicted.
Table 6 - Experiment 1: Source Table for SA Scores
Source

df

SS

MS

Display

32759

32759

Error

2076

259

Scenario

73

73

Interaction

Observed
Power

126.26**

0.94

1.00

2.38

0.23

0.28

0.28

0.03

0.08

1

Error
Total

Eta2

19

246

31

35162

33131

**(p< 0.001)

Table 7 - Experiment 1: Estimates of Effect Size
Measure

Failure Detection
Time (ms)

Situation
Awareness

Display

Mean

Std. Dev.

WX

9595.51

6194.24

MSG

3096.11

618.37

WX

89.03

8.80

MSG

169.97

21.13
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Cohen's d

Effect Size

1.48

0.59

5.00

0.93

For Experiment 1, estimates of effect size were calculated using Cohen's descriptive
method. The values for Cohen's d for Experiment 1 can be seen in Table 7 above. The results
indicated that 59% of the variability in the failure detection time variable was explained by the
difference in the display type viewed by the subjects in the experiment. In addition, 93% of the
variability in situation awareness variable could be accounted for by the difference in the display
type viewed by the subjects during the experiment.

5.2 - Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was conducted as a follow-up experiment to Experiment 1. Based on the
observations of strong main effects of DISPLAY TYPE for both failure detection time and SA
shown by the SPSS output for Experiment 1, the experimental design was not altered. Ten
different ERAU Aeronautical Science student volunteers served as subjects for the second
experiment. The data collected during Experiment 2 for failure detection time, SART scores,
and accuracy, were again organized by SCENARIO TYPE, (the within subjects variable), and
DISPLAY TYPE, (the between subjects variable). With respect to SCENARIO TYPE (i.e.
mission scenario vs. system scenario), the means for failure detection time and SART were
calculated for each subject. The means were then input into SPSS's repeated measures analysis
component with SCENARIO TYPE as the repeated measure.

Once again, the accuracy

questions that followed each scenario were not statistically analyzed. The tables (8 & 9) below
list the responses to the background questionnaire administered to each subject prior to the
experiment.
Average failure detection time was again more rapid for those subjects in the MSG group
than the weather group. For both mission and system scenarios the MSG group detected the
failure or deviation three times quicker than those without the benefit of the MSG display. This
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Table 8 Experiment 2: Average Age and Flight Experience
Display

Demographic

Mean

Std. Deviation

Age(yrs)

21.20

1.64

N

WX

5
Experience (hrs)

282.00

43.24

Age(yrs)

23.60

5.81

MSG

5
Experience (hrs)

282.00

99.12

Table 9 - Experiment 2: Gender and Training Location
Gender

Training Location

Display

Male

Female

ERAU only

ERAU&NonERAU

WX

5

0

2

3

MSG

4

1

3

2

observation is supported by the significant mean differences for the between subjects factor
DISPLAY TYPE, F(l,8) = 28.00, p<0.001. However, unlike the first experiment, there was no
statistical significance for SCENARIO TYPE nor for the interaction between SCENARIO TYPE
and DISPLAY TYPE. Table 10 below lists the computed means and Table 11 is the statistical
source table for the failure detection time data collected during Experiment 2.
Average SA computed from the subjective SART questionnaires for Experiment 2
repeated the results found in Experiment 1. Again, a main effect for DISPLAY TYPE was found
however, there was no effect for SCENARIO TYPE or the interaction of DISPLAY TYPE by
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Table 10 - Experiment 2: Table of Means for Failure Detection Time
Failure
Detection
Time

Display

Mean (ms)

Std. Deviation

N

WX Display

11439.97

3333.20

5

MSG Display

3874.91

1184.54

5

WX Display

12019.51

3909.77

5

MSG Display

3830.63

1001.56

5

condition

Mission
Scenarios

System
Scenarios

Table 11 - Experiment 2: Source Table for Failure Detection Time
Source

Eta^

Observed
Power

28.00**

0.78

0.99

358125

0.11

0.01

0.06

486457

486453

0.15

0.02

0.06

26572325

3321541

426289152

325479370

SS

MS

Display

310233394

310233394

Error

88638855

11079857

Scenario

358125

Interaction

df

1

Error
Total

19

**(p< 0.001)

SCENARIO TYPE.

The MSG display group again had average SA scores that were nearly

twice the average of those in the weather display group, regardless of the type of scenario. This
observation is supported by the statistically significant mean differences seen for the between
subjects factor DISPLAY TYPE, F(l,8) = 16.91, p<0.003. However, like Experiment 1, average
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SA did not fluctuate across SCENARIO TYPE for either the weather display or MSG display
groups, w hich e xplains w hy S CENARIO T YPE a nd t he i nteraction o f S CENARIO T YPE b y
DISPLAY TYPE were not found to be statistically significant for Experiment 2. Table 11 is an
overview of the sample means and Table 12 is the statistical source table for the SART for
Experiment 2.

Table 12 - Experiment 2: Table of Means for SA Scores
SA

Display
Condition

Mean

Std. Deviation

N

Mission

WX Display

81.26

37.93

5

Scenarios

MSG Display

153.03

23.56

5

System

WX Display

76.54

19.26

5

Scenarios

MSG Display

142.40

32.22

5

Unlike Experiment 1, the accuracy questions did not show any indication of the "low
fuel" classification confusion evident in the first experiment for the weather display group.
Every subject that participated in Experiment 2 correctly classified and identified each scenario.
Therefore, a statistical analysis of the accuracy questions was not performed
As in Experiment 1, estimates of effect size were calculated using Cohen's descriptive
method. The values for Cohen's d for Experiment 2 can be seen in Table 14 below. The results
indicated that 61% of the variability in the failure detection time variable are explained by the
difference in the display type viewed by the subjects in the experiment. In addition, 69% of the
variability in situation awareness variable can be accounted for by the difference in the display
type viewed by the subjects during the experiment.
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Table 13 - Experiment 2: Source Table for SA Scores
Eta2

Observed
Power

16.91*

0.68

0.95

294

0.98

0.11

0.14

44

44

0.15

0.02

0.06

8

2412

301

19

28502

24576

Source

df

SS

MS

Display

1

23677

23677

Error

8

2076

259

Scenario

1

294

Interaction

1

Error
Total
*(p<0.01)

Table 14 - Experiment 2: Estimates of Effect Size
Measure

Failure Detection
Time (ms)

Situation
Awareness

Display

Mean

Std. Dev.

WX

11729.74

7061.99

MSG

3852.77

1655.10

WX

78.90

38.33

MSG

147.71

34.01
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Cohen's d

Effect Size

1.54

0.61

1.90

0.69

6.0 - Discussion

6.1 - Experiment 1
The robust results detected by this experiment support the hypotheses put forth earlier in
this research. The MSG display clearly sped up failure detection time, and subjective situation
awareness s cores d oubled w hen t he M SG d isplay was p resent. T he e mergent features o f t he
polar star design, the logical groupings of pertinent system and mission parameters, and the
simplicity of the uncluttered display layout have fulfilled the claims of fostering a more rapid
perception of cues in the environment. Average failure detection time was dramatically lower
for t he M SG g roup then the w eather d isplay group; h owever, an i nteraction w as found t o b e
present that was not expected between the within subjects variable of SCENARIO TYPE and the
between subjects variable of DISPLAY TYPE.

Subjects in the weather display group had

substantially lower failure detection times for mission scenarios then system scenarios. This
trend was not evident in the MSG group. This is possibly due to the fact that the gauges and
instruments such as the altimeter, heading indicator, and airspeed indicator, used to depict
mission deviations or failures are fairly universal in the general aviation domain. Conversely,
the hydraulic pressure indicator, oil temperature gauge, and fuel gauges, used to depict system
failures or deviations can and often do change from aircraft to aircraft. Therefore, one possible
explanation for the effect of SCENARIO TYPE found in this study is that the subject's
unfamiliarity with the system gauges used in this experiment was likely a factor in how quickly
pertinent information was absorbed from these gauges and instruments. Regardless, MSG has
clearly demonstrated that it can fill the role of an automated monitor while serving to reduce the
amount of time required for pertinent information to be transferred from source to human
processor.
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Quicker detection of a failure or deviation by using MSG was only one of the hypotheses
intended to be tested by this research. The other primary hypothesis was that the subjects would
have a more complete and accurate view of the "big picture", otherwise known as higher
situation awareness. This experiment took an initial step in investigating the impact that MSG
displays have on situation awareness. Trujillo (2002), concluded that her research, thus far, has
demonstrated that the MSG displays can be useful for integrating complex information in a
meaningful manner but never made the connection to situation awareness. The subjective SA
scores computed from the data collected in this experiment, on average, were twice as large
when the MSG display was present than when it was replaced by the weather radar display.
Endsley's (2000) "information gap" between the illogically scattered volumes of data being
displayed and a pilot's ability to find the data that are important, proclaimed to be the primary
challenge to situation awareness, seems to shrink dramatically with MSG based on the
comparison of the SA scores between the two display groups.

The accuracy questions that

followed each subjective SART questionnaire served to confirm that the subjective SART scores
were indeed based on an accurate internalized view of the current state of the aircraft. The fact
that every subject in the MSG display condition was able to correctly classify and specifically
identify every deviation or failure they saw, consistently, provides strong credibility to the claim
that MSG truly did serve to enhance situation awareness in those subjects belonging to the MSG
display group.
Figure 5 consists of two plots of means from the data gathered in Experiment 1. The
unexpected interaction of SCENARIO TYPE by DISPLAY TYPE can be seen in the upward
sloping line for the weather display condition in the plot labeled Average Failure Detection Time
- Experiment 1. The parallel sloping lines seen in the SA data plot for Experiment 1 are
evidence of the lack of a statistically significant interaction between SCENARIO TYPE and
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Figure 5 - Plots of means for Experiment 1
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DISPLAY TYPE. The lack of an interaction, in this case, was not alarming. The type of
scenario was hypothesized to not have an impact on the subjective value of SA that would be
reported by the subjects. A second experiment was conducted to test whether the results of
Experiment 1 could be repeated, thereby adding support to this research, overall.

6.2 - Experiment 2
The second experiment was essentially a repeat of the first. Due to the significant results
of the first experiment and the observed power indicated by SPSS, the number of subjects was
held at ten. Average failure detection time was again much more rapid for those subjects in the
MSG group than in the weather group. For both mission and system scenarios the MSG group
detected the failure or deviation three times quicker than those without the benefit of the MSG
display. However, unlike the first experiment, there was no interaction between the SCENARIO
TYPE and DISPLAY TYPE and subsequently, SCENARIO TYPE alone also did not show an
effect. The lack of interaction in the second experiment is not alarming and may simply have
been a chance occurrence observed in the first experiment. Since interaction in Experiment 1
occurred solely within the weather display condition group, it would be only mildly worth
watching for in future MSG experimental research. Furthermore, the interaction, or lack thereof,
may possibly be explained by the difference in strategy employed by the subjects in the different
experiments. In Experiment 2, the subjects may have been attempting to provide their best
possible effort thereby cautiously scanning the panel with a more consistent investment of time
then those subjects in Experiment 1 whose familiarity with the gauges used to depict mission
failures or deviations made them more comfortable stopping the scenario sooner. The lack of the
aforementioned interaction can be easily seen in the parallel sloping lines for both the weather
display condition and the MSG display condition in the plot labeled Average Failure Detection
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Time - Experiment 2 (Figure 6).

In Experiment 2, failure detection time again supported the

hypothesis that the MSG display group would have lower Failure Detection times than the
weather display group. The confirmation of this main effect, received by conducting this followup experiment, shows that the Mission Status Graphics display is reducing the amount of time
required for pilots to scan the available instruments by drawing their eye to the MSG display
which in turn tells the pilot where to focus his attention. The color changing vertices, the relative
movement of the parameters, and the presence of the reference circle, come to together to serve
as emergent features that have the ability to facilitate pre-attentive visual processing, thereby
substantially shortening the time required to perceive critical information.
The average SA computed from the subjective SART questionnaires for Experiment 2
repeated the results found in Experiment 1, as well. The MSG display group again had average
SA scores nearly twice the average of those in the weather display group, regardless of the type
of scenario. Furthermore, a review of the accuracy questions did not show any indication of the
"low fuel" classification confusion evident in the first experiment for the weather display group.
Every subject that participated in Experiment 2 correctly classified and identified each scenario
shown to them, thereby further strengthening confidence in the subjective SART data collected.
The variability inherent in any subjective measure requires that a measure of caution be used
when drawing conclusions from data of this type. However, the average computed SART scores
for both experiments can be reasonably trusted to be true after confirming that all subjects,
regardless of SCENARIO TYPE or display group, correctly identified every deviation or failure.
Again, MSG has clearly lived up to its theorized potential by demonstrating repeatable results for
nearly doubling the average situation awareness scores reported by the MSG display group when
compared to the weather display group. This statistically significant main effect is not surprising
given the fact that both the research by Woods, Wise, and Hanes (1981) and Bartolone and
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Trujillo (2002) have both stated that the benefits of displaying information in the polar star
display format h ave s ubstantial p otential. T hat potential h as b een t ested i n t his r esearch a nd
statistically confirmed.

6.3 - General Discussion and Conclusions
In light of the results of both experiments it can reasonably be stated that the presence of
the Mission Status Graphics polar star display facilitates a more rapid detection of failures or
deviations than when only the traditional instrumentation is used. Furthermore, the consistently
sharp difference in the subjective SART scores between the weather and MSG display conditions
indicates that, at the very least, the subjects who were exposed to the MSG display felt it
markedly improved their situation awareness. Additionally, the large effects estimated by the
Cohen's d calculations performed on the data bolster confidence in these statements.
With the MSG display, average failure detection time was decreased by at least one half
in Experiment 1 and by two-thirds in Experiment 2, when compared to the weather display.
Average subjective SA scores were approximately twice as high with the presence of the MSG
display in both experiments, indicating a higher perceived level of situation awareness.
However, subjective measurement of situation awareness can be inconsistent and difficult to
verify but the presence of the accuracy questions in this research raises confidence in the
conclusions drawn from the SA data. Caution in how these conclusions should be interpreted is
still warranted due to the known limitations of SART and its close resemblance to workload
measurement techniques.

However, the observed statistical power was large for both

experiments and the effect of the presence of the MSG display yielded significant statistical
results for Experiment 2, just as it had in Experiment 1, showing that this experimental design is
capable of replication. The lack of a significant interaction between SCENARIO TYPE and
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DISPLAY TYPE in Experiment 2 and the subsequent missing significance for SCENARIO
TYPE alone, may have been influenced by a difference in the strategy employed by the different
subjects in each experiment.
The fact that the results from this pair of experiments were significant and in support of
the hypotheses warrants further research into the capabilities of the MSG display within the
general aviation domain.

At the time when this research was concluded, NASA Langley

Research Center continued to pursue MSG as an active research program for commercial
aviation application. The demonstrated capabilities of the Mission Status Graphics display to
serve as a one-glance automated monitor that is capable of rapid and accurate information
transfer to the human operators who traditionally have poor performance monitoring reliable
systems over time is very encouraging. Such a display has potential for application not only in
aviation but possibly in other domains where human operators are forced to act as monitors in
information rich environments like the control rooms of nuclear power plants, air traffic control
facilities, or within the healthcare industry. This two decade old display methodology has the
potential to save lives and therefore should be further researched so that all its capabilities can be
identified and subsequently utilized to their fullest potential. Since all pilots must first begin
their flight training in general aviation aircraft, this would be the ideal environment for the
introduction of a display such as MSG. With the incorporation of a MSG display, pilots will be
able to acquire, in one glance, the overall mission and system health of the aircraft they are
piloting without the time and resource intensive process of data assimilation from a myriad of
dials, gauges, screens, and displays.
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Appendix A: Situation Awareness and Accuracy Questionnaire

Demand on Attentional Resources
Please place a mark on the line below that reflects your combined opinion of the instability,
complexity, and variability of the situation you were just presented with.
Low

High

Supply of Attentional Resources
Please place a mark on the line below that reflects your degree of arousal, your level of
concentration, and the amount of space attentional capacity leftover, that you experienced while
performing the panel scan you just completed.
Low

High

Understanding of the Situation
Please place a mark on the line below that reflects the amount of information you received and
understood, as well as, the overall value of the information you gained by performing the scan of
the instrument panel you just completed.
Low

High

How would you classify the situation depicted by the instrument panel you just viewed?
(choose one)
Mission
Deviation/Failure

[

|

System
Deviation/Failure

|

|

No deviation or
failure was depicted

In your own words, what specific deviation or failure was depicted on the instrument panel
you just viewed? (Example: Electrical Failure)
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Scenario

Failure/Deviation

Critical Conventional
Gauge/Instrument

Initial Reference
Value

Indicated
Scenario Value

MSG
Parameter

1

Hydraulic Pressure
- Low

Hydraulic Press Gauge

28psi

20 psi

HYDR

2

Airspeed - High

Airspeed Indicator

120 KTS

160 kts

IAS

3

Altitude - High

Altimeter

12,000 ft

15,000 ft

ALT

4

Oil Temp - High

Engine Oil Gauges - Temp

80 deg C

130 deg C

OILT

5

Engine Failure Zero RPM

Engine RPM Gauge

2100 rpm

0 rpm

ENGN

6

Airspeed - Low

Airspeed Indicator

120 KTS

60 kts

IAS

COM1/NAV1

On - Normal

Off

AVNC

0 L & 3/4 R

FUEL

R Main

GEAR

295 deg

HDG

COM 1/NAV 1
Failure
Fuel Low- Left
Tank
Gear - Right Main
Stuck

Fuel Gauge - Left

3/4 L & R tanks

Landing Gear Indicator
Light

10

Heading

Directional Compass

Gear up and
locked
270 deg (due
West)

11

Alternator Failure

Amp Meter

+40 amps

-40 amps

ELEC

12

Vertical Speed Ascent

Vertical Speed Indicator

Ofpm

1200 fpm

VS

13

Oil Pressure - Low

Engine Oil Gauges Pressure

110 psi

6o psi

OILP

14

Altitude - Low

Altimeter

12,000 ft

8,000 ft

ALT

7
8
9

